

Jun'ichi Hasegawa's chapter, which is concerned with international debt as it relates to Africa, analyses a technical subject. The first section describes how growth collapses as a result of debt. In an accessible way, Hasegawa also gives an account of why Japan was at first hesitant to cancel the debt of Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)s. Nobuyuki Hashimoto deals with policy and aid coordination among donors; and the last chapter by Motoki Takahashi is another well-thought-out analysis of both the politics and economics of development aid. Lehman's book provides rich analyses and original insights about Japan's aid policy toward Africa. Authors of the different chapters go to great lengths to help the reader grasp more fully what 'self-help' means, sometimes by linking it to Japan's own historical experiences. Though the conceptual interpretations provided in the book are bound to be contested, this is, of course, a good thing since that can only invigorate the debate and inspire further investigations.

Publication of the books under review is good news. That the major themes in them are closely inter-related, with each theme highlighting different dimensions of the relationship, and that the books were all published in the same year, make them a uniquely valuable set of resources for understanding Japan–Africa relations.

Texts Mentioned

Calder, Kent E., 'Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State', *World Politics*, 40:4 (1988): 517–541.

Calder, Kent E., 'Japan as a Post-Reactive State?' *Orbis*, 47:4 (2003): 605–616.

Morikawa, Jun, *Japan and Africa: Big Business and Diplomacy*. London: C. Hurst, 1997

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The Allies Against the Rising Sun: The United States, the British Nations, and the Defeat of Imperial Japan

NICHOLAS EVAN SARANTAKES

Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009

458, xxi pp. + reference matter; maps, illustrations

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War is political and politics are often influenced by perceptions and suspicions. Throughout America's war against Japan, many elected politicians, military leaders, and members of the press held suspicions that the United Kingdom – and by extension its dominions – were more interested in recapturing their lost empire than joining the final American war effort first and foremost to defeat Japan. In his seminal and still unsurpassed 1978 work, *Allies of a Kind*, historian Christopher Thorne documented with aplomb the tensions and jealousies that existed between the political and military leaders of America and Britain. Other historians since have followed Thorne's lead and classified the relationship between these two countries in the Pacific, Southwest Pacific, and China–Burma–India theatres of war as anything but 'special' and far from being militarily effective.

In *Allies Against the Rising Sun*, historian Nicholas Sarantakes seeks to 'add to the study of US-British relations' (9) as they pertained to the defeat of Japan. In this lengthy volume, he explores three interrelated questions. They are: one, why did the United Kingdom wish to take part in the invasion of Japan; two, why did Commonwealth nations (Canada, Australia and New Zealand) wish to contribute to the final war effort; and three, why did the US agree to Allied participation when these Commonwealth and UK units displaced American ones that had far greater firepower? (7) Politics, Sarantakes suggests, trumped military efficacy. In answering these questions in more detail, Sarantakes suggests that 'the disputes between the Americans and British were often minor echoes of the confrontations that took place within His Majesty's Government' and that 'historians have exaggerated the importance of many differences [between America and Britain] that were nothing more than honest disagreements about the best policy options' (10). These are very bold claims that are not always substantiated. Moreover, Sarantakes seems to brush aside scholars who have raised the issue of inter-Allied tensions in a rather nonchalant fashion, writing, 'we should remember that [the Allied partnership] worked much better than the one among the Germans, Italians, and Japanese' (10). This is a pretty low and unimaginative bar by which to measure any 'alliance' or even coalition.

The first third of this study explores the acrimony that existed between Prime Minister Churchill and his chiefs of staff over British war aims in Asia and the Pacific. Sarantakes provides colourful and engaging descriptions of the actors, their aims and objectives and their idiosyncrasies. Sarantakes adds to what Thorne and others documented previously, namely that Churchill often favoured an advance against Japan through which Britain could reclaim its empire. The chiefs of staff, on the other hand, sought a policy more in keeping with the American desire to strike at the heart of Japan when the time arose. Sarantakes goes beyond Thorne's analysis by examining the desires held and policies advocated by the United Kingdom's dominions. Moreover, he skilfully exposes the tensions that developed between the civilian leaders and military commanders in Canada and Australia. Sarantakes does a wonderful job documenting how bureaucratic politics encouraged the Royal Canadian Navy and the Royal Canadian Air Force to advocate a much larger Canadian role in the Pacific theatre than envisaged by Canada's civilian leaders. Why? Both services believed that successful participation would translate into larger postwar budgets.

US military commanders responded to such calls for greater Allied participation in the final push against Japan, however, with a high degree of ambivalence that stemmed more from tactical realities than larger political disagreements. Logistics, as Sarantakes demonstrates well, 'continued to plague the British in operations against Japan and ultimately limited the utility of the Royal Navy' (296). Operating off Okinawa, the Royal Navy was a long way from its supply bases. Moreover, many of its crew quarters on warships were not well suited for tropical conditions and even the mundane but essential task of refuelling warships astern proved challenging. Many similar problems likewise limited the ambitions of RAF leaders to deploy Lancaster bombers to the Pacific for the final assault against Japan. US Army Air Corps General 'Hap' Arnold suggested that such a move 'complicated logistics' and would add 'little to the combat effectiveness of the bombers already striking Japan' (307). The Boeing B-29 was a far superior plane in every way and US officials simply resisted any attempt to make space for British bombers at already full Pacific island airbases.

However informative this study is, two omissions weaken it. The first revolves around the important ally in the Asia-Pacific theatre that gets no mention: China. Chiang Kai-shek does not even appear in the index. While the focus of this book is not the 'grand alliance' against Japan, the positions, aims, and ambitions of Chiang's China influenced Roosevelt's thinking about the war. Some mention of China is warranted. Roosevelt's personal representative to

Chiang in late 1944, Patrick Hurley, was extremely critical of what he perceived to be Britain's postwar plans for China and Southeast Asia and he made his opinion known to everyone, including Roosevelt. Did the negative views held by Hurley and others influence US–UK relations or planning? Sarantakes's claim that disputes between America and Britain have been exaggerated loses its punch given his neglect of the China–America–Britain component of the war against Japan. A second weakness surrounds this study's abrupt conclusion with the cessation of hostilities in August 1945. Commonwealth forces took part in the Allied Occupation of Japan and at least some discussion of the politics and practicalities of this undertaking seems a rather logical way to end this study. This is particularly true because Commonwealth participation was based far more heavily on politics than on military necessity and thus it fits nicely with the overall theme of Sarantakes's work.

Text Mentioned

Thorne, Christopher, *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War Against Japan, 1941–1945*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978.

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Transpacific Dreams: How Baseball Linked the United States and Japan in Peace and War

SAYURI GUTHRIE-SHIMIZU

Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012

xi, 244 pp. + notes, bibliography, index; illustrations

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<http://uncpress.unc.edu/books/11724.html>

This is an ambitious book which goes far beyond the confines of the baseball diamond. It is very much transnational history, and uses baseball to retell two hitherto 'relatively distinct national stories ... as a braided historical narrative' (7). It is equally a history of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century globalization. Baseball emerges in this particularly persuasive account as a force for 'human solidarities and communities of belonging' that were 'neither totally amenable to state control nor... replaceable with local or national allegiances' (6).

Sayuri Guthrie-Shimizu opens, naturally enough, with an account of how 'baseball ... became America's game in Japan' (32). The game arrived in Japan as early as the 1870s, and the channel was basically twofold: Americans arriving in Meiji Japan as college and agricultural instructors, and Japanese returning home after receiving an education in the United States. The game's disseminators were usually driven not only by a passion for the sport, but also by notions of 'Christian manliness,' according to which a 'healthy body was the keystone of moral and "manly" Christian life' (17). The Japanese who in ever-increasing numbers embraced baseball did so at least partly because they, too, embraced the ideal of the healthy body (most stopped short, however, at Christianity). Others in Japan embraced baseball as a 'spectator sport,' and – wittingly or otherwise –